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In this paper, we examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural 
protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing 
the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political 
economy of trade policy formulation. We then set out a basic framework that allows us to put 
forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. We 
find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality 
are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-
function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the 
variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The 
results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized 
and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with 
predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to 
agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance 
aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important. 
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Barring very few exceptions, international trade has never and nowhere been free, even 
though only under extraordinary circumstances are deviations from free trade optimal. To 
explain this puzzle, an entire literature on the political economy of trade policy has emerged 
over the last three decades. In this literature, one common feature is that trade policies are 
chosen not with the aim of maximizing national economic efficiency and aggregate welfare, 
but set by politicians and policy makers whose objective functions diverge from aggregate 
welfare. Trade policies in this view, are often used as indirect tools to redistribute income to 
certain targeted groups. The identity of these groups depends on (a) the type of political-
economy framework (lobbying or majority voting) assumed, (b) the actual economic, 
political and geographic characteristics of the various sectors in the economy that determine 
which of them are politically organized, and (c) the political and economic ideology of the 
government.  
The objective of this chapter is to explain both the cross-country variations in 
agricultural protection and the within-country evolution of this protection over time. The 
general trend has been an increase in agricultural protection in developed countries over time 
as their per capita incomes have increased.
1 This protection has taken the form of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers on imports plus substantial subsidies provided by governments to their 
farmers. While membership in the GATT/WTO has attempted to control the growth of such 
protection in developed countries, it has so far not succeeded in eliminating or reducing it. In 
fact, agricultural support or protection is one of the primary reasons behind the current 
impasse in the Doha Round of trade talks. In developing countries, by contrast, the bias has 
been against agriculture and in favor of the manufacturing sector which has historically been 
highly protected. This has resulted in negative effective rates of protection for agriculture. 
This bias against agriculture has been reduced in recent times. It is these trends in agricultural 
                                                 
1 For detailed theoretical and empirical analyses of the evolution of agricultural protection during the process of 
economic development, see Anderson, Hayami and Others (1986) and Hai (1991).   2
protection in developed and developing countries and the differences in their levels across 
countries that we are proposing to explain. In doing so, we draw upon the vast theoretical 
literature on the political economy of trade policy. 
  To examine the political-economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection 
across countries and within countries over time, we set up a basic framework that allows us to 
put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. 
We find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income 
inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-
support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the 
variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. In other 
words, while the government’s decision-making has some partisan elements, the concerns of 
the majority are also important.  
  We find that our results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes 
that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. The predictions of a model in which 
labor is assumed to be a general, intersectorally mobile factor do not hold. Finally, some 
aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that 
agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related 
to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically 
important. Moreover, lobbying considerations are relatively more important in high-income 
countries, while public finance aspects are empirically relevant for developing countries. 
  This chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of pertinent 
literature review, before we set up a theoretical framework where we lay out all the 
hypotheses that we are going to test. We then briefly discuss our data sources and 
econometric methodology and present the results, before drawing some conclusions. 
 
 
Literature review  
 
 
Political economy models of trade are of two main types. In the first type, called “median 
voter” models, the approach taken is one of majority voting. The second type, “lobbying 
models”, may be further classified (following the typology in Rodrik 1995) into four 
approaches: (1) the tariff-formation function approach, (2) the political support function 
approach, (3) the political contributions approach and (4) the campaign contributions   3
approach. Within these lobbying models, (1) and (2) adopt a black-box approach to the 
modeling of lobbying in trade policy, while (3) and (4) have much stronger 
microfoundations.  
Under the tariff-formation function approach, the tariff is a direct increasing function 
of resources going into lobbying in favor of the tariff and a decreasing function of lobbying 
resources devoted against the tariff. No microfoundations are provided for the function itself. 
Examples of this approach include Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Feenstra and Bhagwati 
(1982) and Rodrik (1986).  
In models using the political support function approach, the government maximizes 
an objective function where different groups in the general population are given different 
weights depending on their political importance to the incumbent government (Hillman 1989, 
van Long and Vousden 1991).  
In political contribution models, policies are determined through contributions by 
lobbies to incumbent politicians (Grossman and Helpman 1994), whereas in campaign 
contribution models, political competition between parties is fully modeled and contributions 
are made to competing parties (Magee, Brock and Young 1989).  
In the theoretical modeling of endogenous protection, Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
made the biggest advance in providing strong microfoundations to the behavior of lobbies 
and the government, where the government maximizes a weighted sum of contributions and 
aggregate welfare, taking as given contribution schedules provided by lobbies in a prior 
stage. Mitra (1999) endogenizes the formation of lobbies within this framework and analyzes 
its implications for sectoral tariffs.  
 
Empirical implications of the median-voter approach 
 
In the median voter approach to tariff formulation, preferences on tariffs are assumed to be 
“single peaked” and conditions are imposed such that the most-preferred policy of each 
individual is monotonic in a certain characteristic. Then, holding other individual 
characteristics constant across the population, the tariff chosen under two-candidate electoral 
competition is the median voter’s most preferred tariff. The median voter here is the median 
individual in the economy when all individuals in the economy are ranked according to the 
characteristic under consideration. Mayer (1984) applied this median-voter principle to the 
Heckscher-Ohlin and specific-factors trade models. In the Heckscher-Ohlin case, the political 
economy equilibrium tariff is the most-preferred tariff of the median individual in the   4
economy-wide ranking of the ratio of capital to labor ownership. If this median individual’s 
capital to labor ratio is less than the economy’s overall capital to labor ratio, that is, if the 
asset distribution in the economy is unequal, the equilibrium trade policy is different from 
free trade and is one that redistributes income from capital to labor. Hence it is pro-trade in a 
labor-abundant economy and anti-trade in a capital-abundant economy.  
In the Heckscher-Ohlin version of the Mayer median-voter model, a simple 
comparative static exercise produces the following result which is the main hypothesis that is 
empirically tested in Dutt and Mitra (2002): A rise in asset inequality will make trade policy 
more pro-trade in a labor abundant economy and more protectionist in a capital-abundant 
economy.  
Dutt and Mitra (2002) estimate the following protection equation using cross-country 
data on inequality, capital-abundance and diverse measures of protection: 
c c c c c c v L K Inequality Inequality L K t + + + + = ) / ( ) ( ) ( ) / ( 3 2 1 0 α α α α  
where the “c” is an index for country c. The theory predicts that  0 2 < α  and  0 3 > α  such that 
the partial derivative of protection with respect to inequality is positive if K/L is above a 
threshold, and negative if K/L is below that threshold. Dutt and Mitra (2002) find empirical 
support for this hypothesis.
2, 3 Besides running the above regression cross-sectionally, Dutt 
and Mitra also run the regression in time differences (difference between the 1990s and 
1980s) and find strong empirical support. Thus, not only does the above median-voter 
prediction help explain variations in overall trade protection levels across countries, it also 
can explain long-run policy changes within a country. 
 
Empirical implications of the special-interest approach 
 
The special-interest approach has evolved from the simple Findlay-Wellisz (1982) “tariff-
formation function” approach to the state-of-the-art Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
                                                 
2 In this context, it is also important to mention Milner and Kubota (2005) who use a median-voter approach to 
empirically investigate the relationship between democratization and trade reforms in developing countries.  
 
3 Dutt and Mitra (2005) also perform a cross-country empirical investigation of the role of political ideology in 
trade policy determination. They use a political-support function approach within a two-sector, two-factor 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. See Milner and Judkins (2004) on this issue. Also, see Hiscox (2001) who performs a 
study of six western nations to look at how historically the nature and structure of partisanship on trade issues 
change over time and depend on the extent of intersectoral factor mobility. Hiscox (2002) looks at the same 
question exclusively for the US, analyzing major pieces of congressional trade legislation between 1824 and 
1994. 
   5
“political-contributions” model.  The latter is a very significant advance in several directions. 
Firstly, it is multisectoral. Secondly, it provides strong microfoundations to the behavior of 
the different actors in the model. A “menu-auctions” approach is used in modeling policy 
bidding by interest groups. Multiple principals, namely the various organized lobbies, try to 
influence the common agent, namely the government. The government's objective function is 
linear in political contributions and aggregate welfare, while each lobby maximizes its 
welfare net of political contributions. The level of protection for each industry is derived as 
an econometrically estimable function of industry characteristics and other political and 
economic factors. Most importantly, especially from an empirical perspective, the model 
provides the following hypothesis: Holding everything else constant, organized sectors are 
granted higher protection than unorganized sectors. Further, protection to organized sectors 
is negatively related to import penetration and the (absolute value of the) import demand 
elasticity, while protection to unorganized sectors is positively related to these two variables.  





















where ti denotes the ad valorem tariff (export subsidy in the case of an exportable) to sector i, 
zi represents the output to import ratio (output to export ratio in the case of an exportable) in 
that sector, ei its import demand elasticity (export supply elasticity in the case of an 
exportable),  L α the proportion of the total population of the economy that is politically 
organized and a is the weight placed by the government on aggregate welfare relative to 
political contributions in its objective function. Ii is an indicator variable that takes the value 
1 if the sector is politically organized and 0 otherwise.  
The predictions of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model are very intuitive: If an 
industry is import-competing and is organized (Ii = 1) then it buys protection and receives a 
positive tariff. If an industry is an exporter and organized, it is able to “buy” an export 
subsidy. Next, a high import penetration ratio (high volume of imports relative to domestic 
output of importables) implies that specific-factor owners have less to gain from the increase 
in domestic price induced by the tariff and the economy has more to lose from protection. So 
we are likely to see lower levels of protection. Similarly, when the import elasticity is higher, 
the deadweight loss from protection is also higher, so the government will grant it lower 
levels of protection. Next, an unorganized sector gets negative protection according to this 
theory if  0 > L α  and gets zero protection if  0 = L α , which is the case where factor ownership   6
and political organization are concentrated in the hands of a few people that form a negligible 






























where this equation can be linearly estimated with 
L
L







 as the two coefficients 
that are directly estimated, and then a and  L α  can be inferred from the two coefficient 
estimates. Alternatively, these parameters can be directly estimated by non-linear estimation.  
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) estimate the 
Grossman-Helpman “Protection for Sale” tariff expressions using industry-level data from 
the United States. Using slightly different econometric specifications from each other, both 
papers confirm empirically the Grossman-Helpman prediction regarding the relationship of 
protection to import protection and import demand elasticity. Holding everything else 
constant, organized sectors are granted higher protection than unorganized sectors. Both these 
papers find that the weight on aggregate welfare in the government's objective function (a) is 
several times higher than that on contributions. This finding is somewhat puzzling and 
perhaps worrisome. Although the Grossman-Helpman model does not provide any indication 
on the expected magnitude of the parameter a, the higher the weight governments put on 
aggregate welfare, the less compelling seems the raison d’être for the entire political 
economy literature. Moreover, the estimates of the proportion of population who are 
organized are very high in both the Goldberg-Maggi and Gawande-Bandyopadhyay papers. 
Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) and McCalman (2004) obtain similarly high 
parameter estimates of the Grossman-Helpman model for Turkey and Australia respectively.  
An interesting result that comes out of the empirical exercise by Mitra, Thomakos and 
Ulubasoglu is that the relative weight on aggregate welfare was higher in the democratic 
regime than under the dictatorial regime in Turkey for the period spanned by the dataset. Due 
to the panel nature of the dataset, this study is able to explain both the cross-industry as well 
as the time series variation in protection.   
Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006) use a new dataset on foreign political activity 
in the US and extend the “Protection for Sale” model to include foreign lobbies. In line with 
the Grossman-Helpman prediction, they find that foreign lobbying activity has significantly 
reduced US trade barriers. As a result, foreign lobbying has increased consumer surplus and   7
overall welfare in the US. In another empirical application, through an extension of the 
Grossman-Helpman model, Gawande and Krishna (2006) investigate the effects of US trade 
policy lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. Their parameter 
estimates are a significant improvement over those in the earlier literature even though they 
do not completely resolve the puzzle.  
Finally, the most relevant paper from the point of view of the present study is the 
recent paper by Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2008). This paper looks at the cross-
country and cross-industry variations in protection at the same time. The Grossman-Helpman 




















where the subscript “ict” denotes industry i in country c at time t. Assuming ownership of 
specific factors and political organization to be fully concentrated among a negligible 
















































= β  is a measure of a government’s affinity for political contributions, and its inverse 
gives us the weight the government puts on aggregate welfare relative to contributions in its 
objective function. The ranking of countries on the basis of the estimates of a and 1/a 
obtained by Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga is quite realistic. The Spearman rank   8
correlation of this estimate with Transparency International’s corruption index turns out to be 
0.67. Several political variables from the Database on Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), 
such as constraints on the executive, competition for executive, party concentration and 
number of government seats, do very well in explaining the variation in a and 1/a. In 
addition, institutional variables such as the nature of the legal system also perform well. This 
study, therefore, provides useful insights into the institutional and political variables that may 
potentially explain the variation in protection to agriculture both across space and over time. 
Empirical implications of the political ideology or partisan government approach 
  
Dutt and Mitra (2005) use a reduced form special-interest approach (earlier referred to as the 
“political support function” approach) to study how variations in political ideology of 
governments can explain international and inter-temporal variations in protection. Ideology 
of the government is labeled as right, center and left. Using the same Stolper-Samuelson 
intuition as in their median-voter paper, they arrive at the following testable hypothesis: A 
more left-wing government (i.e., that attaches a higher weight on the welfare of 
workers/labor) is more protectionist in the case of capital-abundant countries but is less 
protectionist in the case of capital-scarce countries. That hypothesis results in the following 
estimating equation:   
c c c c c c v L K L K t + + + + = ) / ( ) Ideology ( ) Ideology ( ) / ( 3 2 1 0 α α α α  
Dutt and Mitra (2002) find support for their ideology hypothesis. In another paper, 
Dutt and Mitra (2006) combine both their ideology and their inequality (median-voter) 
hypotheses into the following umbrella model to show that protection is determined both by 
general-interest and special-interest concerns: 
c
c c c c c c c c
v
L K L K L K t
+
+ + + + + = ) / ( ) Inequality ( ) / ( ) Ideology ( ) Inequality ( ) Ideology ( ) / ( 4 4 3 2 1 0 α α α α α α
Again, these models provide some guidance for the present study of agricultural protection. 
Lessons from the “first generation” empirical work 
 
Unlike recent work described above, the early empirical literature, or what Gawande and 
Krishna (2003) call “first generation” empirical work on endogenous trade policy, is not   9
driven by formal models. Nevertheless, we believe it does provide very useful insights and 
guidance for future research. It is important here to note that there were some important 
correlations revealed between tariffs and a number of political and economic variables by this 
early literature. For example Baldwin (1985) found that tariffs are higher for industries that 
are labor intensive, have low wages, have a small number of firms and employ a large 
number of workers, and experience a high degree of import penetration. Also, he finds that 
tariff cuts from the GATT’s Tokyo round were the lowest for the most unskilled labor 
intensive industries.  
Another well-known empirical piece from the early literature on the political 
economy of trade policy is by Trefler (1993), who finds that import penetration and other 
comparative advantage measures are more important in the determination of the non-tariff 
barrier coverage ratios than industry concentration, scale and capital measures. 
Other important papers in the old literature include Caves (1976), Saunders (1980), 
Ray (1981), Marvel and Ray (1983), Ray (1991) and Trefler (1993).
4 The main finding of 
this early empirical literature is that protection is higher for sectors that are labor-intensive, 
low-skill and low-wage, for consumer-goods industries, for industries facing high import 
penetration when geographical concentration of production is high but that of consumers is 
low, and in sectors with low levels of intra-industry trade.
5 
 
Lessons from the literature on agricultural protection 
 
A large proportion of the theoretical research on the political economy of trade policy prior to 
the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model was on agricultural protection. Noteworthy in this 
literature is Swinnen (1994), who uses a Hillman-type of political support function approach 
within a fairly rich structure of the economy (three factors, of which one is mobile and two 
are fixed), to study the relationship between agricultural protection and economic 
development.
6  
                                                 
4 See Rodrik (1995) for a detailed survey of this literature. 
 
5For an examination of the cross-national variation in average protection levels across industrialized countries, 
see Mansfield and Busch (1995). They find that non-tariff barriers are increasing in country size, unemployment 
rate and number of parliamentary constituencies and are higher for countries that use proportional representation 
as their electoral system. 
 
6 For an application, see Swinnen, Banerjee and de Gorter (2001). The literature on the political economy of 
agricultural protection until the early 1990s is comprehensively surveyed in de Gorter and Swinnen (2002). 
   10
Honma (1993), who uses the Anderson and Hayami (1986) framework, finds support 
for the Anderson (1992) hypothesis that the shrinking of the agricultural sector makes 
opposition to agricultural protection more diffused and the lobbying for it more 
concentrated.
7  Honma uses panel data from 14 industrial countries for the period 1955-87. 
He further finds that agricultural protection is inversely related to agricultural relative to 
industry productivity and positively related to deterioration in its terms of trade. 
Olper (1998) tries to explain cross–country variations in agricultural protection among 
the European Union (EU) countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, he looks at the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. He shows that agricultural protection is 
countercyclical to market conditions and is positively related to the extent of comparative 
disadvantage in agriculture. Also, agricultural protection is greater in countries with a smaller 
number of farms, finding evidence for the free-rider problem in lobbying.
8 
Finally, a recent paper by Gawande and Hoekman (2006) tests a modified version of 
the Grossman and Helpman (1994) “Protection for Sale” model for US agriculture. The 
modification is the uncertain outcome of lobbying, and the dataset they use contains both 
agricultural protection (tariffs and subsidies) and PAC contributions in the US during the late 
1990s. This is the first empirical piece in the agricultural protection literature that is 
completely structural in that the estimating equation is derived exclusively from theory.  
 
 
Theoretical framework for the present study 
 
 
In the theory we develop here, we recognize the existence of land as a factor that is of 
primary importance to agriculture. To do this, we make the extreme assumption that land is a 
factor of production specific to agriculture. We develop our hypotheses under two scenarios: 
one where labor is intersectorally mobile, and one where it is sector-specific. 
Consider a two-sector specific-factors model. In the economy under consideration, 
assume there are two sectors, manufacturing and agriculture. The manufacturing sector uses 
capital (specific to manufacturing) and labor under constant returns to scale (CRS), while 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 For a CGE study, based on a similar argument, trying to explain the bias against agriculture in poor countries 
and high agricultural protection in rich countries, see Anderson (1995). 
 
8Also, see Olper (2007) where he looks at the interaction between ideology and inequality in the determination 
of agricultural protection. This work builds on Dutt and Mitra (2002, 2005, 2006).    11
agriculture uses land (specific to agriculture) and labor, also under CRS. An unconditional 
prediction of this set of assumptions is that an increase in agricultural protection increases the 
real incomes (welfare) of landowners, while it reduces the real incomes of capitalists. In this 
framework, if labor is also sector-specific and immobile across sectors, then the prediction 
gets modified to the following: An increase in agricultural protection increases the real 
incomes (welfare) of landowners and agricultural workers, while it reduces the real incomes 
of capitalists and manufacturing workers. On the other hand, if labor is mobile across sectors, 
then the effect of agricultural protection on labor’s welfare is ambiguous – it depends on 
labor’s share of expenditure on agricultural products (food). 
 
Political ideology and inequality 
 
Clearly, in the mobile labor framework described above, a right-wing government (one that 
puts a higher weight on the well-being of capitalists) will try to keep protection as low as 
possible for agriculture. In such a framework, what will a left-wing government do? 
Remember that a left-wing government has an affinity for workers, which means they attach 
a higher weight to labor’s welfare than to the welfare of others in the country. Protecting 
agriculture raises the overall demand for workers in the economy and increases their real 
wages in terms of the manufactured good, but lowers real wages when measured in terms of 
the agricultural good (food). Thus, if the share of expenditure on food is small enough, 
workers will be made better off through agricultural protection. A left-wing government will 
in such situations want to protect agriculture. There will be labor-land coalitions formed in 
such situations. The opposite will be the case when the expenditure share of food is high. 
Since the expenditure share of food varies inversely with per capita income, a left-wing 
government will want to protect agriculture in rich countries and not in poor countries. 
In the immobile labor case, with a move from right-wing to centrist to left-wing 
governments, we will get an increase in agricultural protection if a large proportion of 
employment is in the agricultural sector. Since a left-wing government is pro-labor, it will 
support the sector that has relatively more workers. In general, the share of agriculture in 
employment is higher in poor countries. Therefore, the poorer a country the more likely it is 
that a left-wing government (relative to a right-wing or centrist government) will provide 
assistance to agriculture. 
This brings us to Competing Hypotheses 1:    12
(a) Mobile Labor Case: Countries with left-wing governments will exhibit higher levels of 
agricultural protection when per capita income is high. At high levels of income, 
agricultural protection goes up when the political ideology of the government 
changes from rightist to centrist to leftist.  
(b) Immobile Labor Case: Countries with left-wing governments will exhibit higher levels 
of agricultural protection when per capita income is low. At low levels of income, 
agricultural protection goes up when the political ideology of the government 
changes from rightist to centrist to leftist. 
 
Majority voting and inequality 
 
In a model where governments set policies that have the support of the majority of the 
population, agricultural protection will respond to income inequality. The predicted direction 
of response (to such changes in inequality) will once again depend on whether labor is 
intersectorally mobile or immobile. 
  In the mobile labor case, in a setting where the government tries to put in place 
policies that get majority support, agricultural protection will again be conditional on the food 
expenditure share. When this expenditure share is low, the majority, who are mainly workers, 
are likely to demand higher agricultural protection since this will increase the real incomes of 
workers in terms of their consumption baskets. When the expenditure share of food is low, 
which is the case when income is high, an increase in asset inequality will increase 
agricultural protection. This happens since, with an increase in inequality, the share of labor 
income in the incomes of the majority of the people goes up.
9 The opposite is the case when 
income is low and the share of food in overall expenditure is high.  
In the immobile labor case, with an increase in inequality, there will be a demand for 
inequality reduction and we will get an increase in agricultural protection if a large proportion 
of employment is in the agricultural sector. In general the share of agriculture in employment 
is higher in poor countries. Therefore, the poorer a country the more likely it is that an 
increase in inequality will lead to an increase in assistance to agriculture. 
 Therefore,  we  have  Competing Hypotheses 2:  
(a) Mobile Labor Case: Countries with higher levels of inequality will exhibit higher 
levels of agricultural protection provided income levels are high enough. Countries 
                                                 
9 In the median voter model, it is common to assume that the median voter is labor rich and asset poor. From an 
empirical perspective as well, such an assumption seems plausible.   13
that experience an increase in inequality will increase their levels of agricultural 
protection over time, provided income levels are high enough. 
(b) Immobile Labor Case: Countries with higher levels of inequality will exhibit higher 
levels of agricultural protection provided income levels are low enough. Countries 
that experience an increase in inequality will increase their levels of agricultural 




With economic development and rising per capita incomes, agriculture’s share in overall 
employment goes down. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, in line with the 
traditional Engel effect, the share of expenditure on food goes down. Secondly, technological 
progress in agriculture means that fewer workers are required to produce a given level of 
output. As the employment share of agriculture goes down, agricultural workers and 
landowners will probably find it easier to organize and mitigate the inherent free-rider 
problem of lobby formation. As a result, a decline in the share of employment in agriculture 
is likely to be accompanied by an increase in agricultural protection. Second, if agricultural 
productivity goes up, lobbying becomes more beneficial and we are likely to see more 
agricultural protection. 
  This brings us to the following non-competing (complementary) hypotheses 3:  
(a) Countries with a lower share of employment in agriculture and higher agricultural 
productivity will exhibit higher levels of agricultural protection. 
(b) Countries that experience a falling share of employment in agriculture and rising 
agricultural productivity will increase the levels of agricultural protection over time. 
 
Public finance  
 
During the initial stages of development, a country’s tax infrastructure to raise revenues 
through direct taxes is weak. So revenues are raised through indirect taxes including tariffs on 
imports, which at that stage of development are mainly manufactured goods (but could 
include some agricultural goods). Over time, incomes increase and the returns to having a 
strong direct tax infrastructure rise, which results in government investment in an effective 
internal revenue service. Most of the revenue now comes from income taxes. Some of these   14
revenues can now be used to give agricultural subsidies (especially since most rich countries 
have a comparative disadvantage in agriculture).  
Thus, we have the following non-competing (complementary) hypotheses 4: 
(a) Countries with a small direct tax base (income taxes as a proportion of total tax 
revenues or government expenditure) will exhibit higher levels of agricultural tariffs. 
(b) Countries whose direct tax revenues (as a proportion of total tax revenues or 
government expenditure) rise over time will exhibit a fall in their agricultural tariff 






To test these hypotheses we gather data on political variables from a variety of sources. Table 
1 lists the data sources and the coverage for each of our explanatory variables. 
We examine both the cross-country variations in agricultural protection as well as the within- 
country variation in agricultural protection over time. Table 2 shows the regressions that we 
run and the predicted coefficients on the independent variables to test our cross-country 
hypotheses as well as those which are within country and over time. To investigate cross-
country variations, we use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). For the within-country 
variation over time, we use panel data estimation techniques. This allows us to control for 
unobserved and time-invariant country-specific effects by using country-fixed effects.  
 
Ideology, inequality and agricultural protection 
 
To examine the role played by ideology and inequality in influencing agricultural protection 
we first estimate the following equations: 
ct ct ct ct ct ct income capita per income capita per agprot ε α α α + + + = ) ( ) Ideology ( ) Ideology ( ) ( 3 2 1
ct ct ct ct ct ct income capita per income capita per agprot ε α α α + + + = ) ( ) Inequality ( ) Inequality ( ) ( 3 2 1  
where the subscript “c” is for country and “t” denotes time. “Agprot” stands for agricultural 
protection. For the within-estimates, we add country (as well as time) fixed effects to the 
above specification.  
In table 3, we see how political ideology and inequality affect the Relative Rate of 
Assistance (RRA) to agriculture. In column 1, the coefficient on the ideology variable is   15
positive and significant, while the coefficient on the interaction of ideology with per capita 
income is negative and significant. The signs of the ideology term and its interaction with per 
capita income suggest that the intersectoral mobility of labor is quite low and so the immobile 
labor model is a better approximation to reality than the mobile labor model. Column 2 shows 
that this finding is robust to the addition of three political institution controls: constraints on 
the executive which captures checks and balances on the chief executive (higher in 
democracies); a dummy equal to one for Presidential systems; and a dummy equal to one if 
the ruling party can be classified as rural. Columns 3 and 4 present within-estimates, where 
again we see that political ideology influences agricultural protection. The signs of the 
estimated coefficients are compatible with the immobile labor scenario. 
The coefficient of the ideology term divided by the absolute value of the coefficient of 
the interaction term gives us the critical per capita income at which the relationship changes 
sign. Per capita income is measured in natural logarithms and the threshold is about 8.7 in 
column 1, which in levels is about $6000. When we add country-fixed effects, we observe a 
decline in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates. However, the critical per capita income 
remains substantively unchanged in column 3 (equal to 9).   
Table 4 presents regressions analyzing the effects of inequality in table 4. Columns 1-
3 show pooled OLS estimates while columns 4 and 5 present within-estimates. All columns 
use the income Gini coefficient as the measure of inequality, except column 2 which uses the 
land inequality measure from Li, Squire and Zou (1998). The estimated coefficient on the 
Gini coefficient is positive and significant and its interaction with per capita income is 
negative and significant. As with political ideology, these signs are consistent with the 
immobile labor scenario. The threshold per capita income is only $3000 in this case, except 
for column 2 (where the land Gini is used) where the threshold is even lower. The results 
hold for the within-estimates as well, with the critical per capita income rising to $3500. 
We next explore whether it is actually the relative size of agricultural employment 
that is driving these results. In table 5, instead of per capita income we use the share of 
agriculture in total employment. As expected from the first set of regressions, we now have 
the political ideology coefficient negative and significant. The coefficient of the interaction 
between political ideology and the share of agriculture in employment is positive and 
significant in column 1 (where no fixed effects are used) but insignificant in column 2 where 
country and year fixed effects are used. When inequality is used in place of ideology in these 
regressions (columns 3, 4 and 5), the inequality variable is positive and significant and the 
interaction of inequality with the share of agricultural employment is negative and   16
significant, both in the absence and presence of country and year fixed effects. In other 
words, these results hold in both cross-sectional and within-country, across-time variations in 
the data. 
 
Lobbying and agricultural protection 
 
As the employment share of agriculture goes down, agricultural workers and landowners will 
probably find it easier to organize, as a result of which protection to agriculture is likely to go 
up. In table 6 the negative and significant coefficient of the employment share of agriculture 
provides support for this hypothesis. This is true for all countries pooled together (column 1), 
when we restrict the sample to only OECD countries (column 2), and when we restrict the 
sample to OECD but exclude the Cairns group of countries.
10 We see that this variation is 
both cross-sectional as well within-country across time. The positive and significant 
coefficients of agricultural productivity in table 6 provide support for the hypothesis that as 
agricultural productivity rises, lobbying becomes more beneficial and we are likely to see 
more agricultural protection. The rise in the magnitude of the coefficient between columns 2 
and 3 suggests that lobbying plays a more important role in rich OECD countries. 
 
Revenue motive for agricultural protection 
 
In table 7, the variable of interest is direct taxes as a percentage of total tax revenue. If the 
government has a well developed tax infrastructure, it can raise revenue through direct taxes, 
and it can use some of this revenue to provide agricultural subsidies. In this case there should 
be a complementarity between the government’s ability to raise direct taxes and agricultural 
assistance. On the other hand, if the government is not able to raise direct tax revenues, it 
might have to resort to indirect taxation which can take the form of import tariffs. If these 
tariffs are agricultural tariffs, then we might see some substitutability between direct taxes 
and agricultural assistance. Whether the ability to raise direct taxes negatively or positively 
affects agricultural assistance is therefore an empirical question. All but one of our 
regressions in table 7 show a negative sign for the coefficient of direct taxes as a share of 
total tax revenues. This result holds both for nominal and relative rates of assistance to 
agriculture. For the latter, it is driven primarily by non-OECD countries. 
                                                 






Our main objective in this chapter is to identify the political-economy drivers in the evolution 
of international trade policies with respect to agriculture. Understanding these determinants 
should not only help provide deeper insights into trade policy formulation in general, but also 
allow us to understand what makes agriculture a particularly contentious issue in recent trade 
talks. 
  We have set up a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable 
hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. We find that both the 
political ideology of the government and the degree of inequality are important determinants 
of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the 
median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection 
across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the 
predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. 
Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in 
that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively 
related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of assistance to agriculture also 
seem to be empirically important. 
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 Table 1: Data description 
Variable Years Description
Relative Rate of Assistance to agriculture 
(RRA) 
1955-2007 Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). (Methodology in Anderson et al. 2008.)
 
Nominal  Rate of Assistance to agriculture 
(NRA) 
1955-2007 Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). (Methodology in Anderson et al. 2008.)
  
Political Ideology  1975-2000 Political Ideology of chief executive (the President for Presidential systems and 
largest ruling party for Parliamentary system). Source: Database of Political 
Institutions 2004 (update of Beck et al. 2001). 
 
Income Inequality  1960-1999 Gini coefficients from Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Deininger and Squire (1996, 
1998). Data for the latter at www.worldbank.org/research/inequality/data.htm 
 
Land Inequality  One year Land Gini from Li, Squire and Zou (1998).
 
Per capita GDP  1960-2000 GDP per capita on a PPP basis. Source: World Bank (2007).
 
Share of agriculture in employment  1960-2000 Total workers employed in agriculture as a proportion of labor force. Source: World 
Bank (2007). 
 
Comparative Disadvantage in Agriculture   1960-2000 Measured as (X-M)/(X+M) where X is exports of agricultural products and M is the 
imports of agricultural products. 
 
Direct taxes (% of total taxes)  1970-2000 Direct taxes include income taxes, profits and capital gains tax. Source: World 
Bank (2007). 
 
Constraints on Executive  1960-2000 Extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Source: Polity IV Project, 
(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2000). 
 
Rural party  1975-2000 Dummy equals 1 if chief executive’s party can be classified as rural. Source: 
Database of Political Institutions 2004 (update of Beck et al. 2001).  2
Table 2: Hypotheses and predicted signs 
 
Hypotheses Description  Predicted  signs 
1: Political Ideology  Regress agricultural protection on left-wing 
ideology and leftist ideology*per capita 
income 
Mobile labor case: Negative on leftist 
ideology and positive on the interaction 
term. 
Immobile labor case: Positive on leftist 
ideology and negative on the interaction 
term. 
2: Inequality  Regress agricultural protection on income 
inequality and inequality*per capita income 
Mobile labor case: Negative on inequality 
and positive on the interaction term. 
Immobile labor case: Positive on 
inequality and negative on the interaction 
term. 
3: Lobbying  Regress agricultural protection on share of 
agriculture in employment and agricultural 
productivity 
Negative on employment share and 
positive on agricultural productivity 
4: Public Finance  Regress agricultural protection on share of 
direct taxes in total taxes/expenditure  
Negative on direct tax share  
   3
Table 3: Ideology and agricultural protection: per capita GDP 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  RRA RRA  RRA  RRA 
Left-wing ideology  0.555*** 0.726***  0.270**  0.240* 
  (0.148) (0.177)  (0.124)  (0.133) 
Ideology*per capita GDP  -0.064*** -0.082***  -0.030**  -0.027* 
  (0.017) (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
per capita GDP  0.528*** 0.562***  0.385***  0.376*** 
  (0.046) (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.063) 
Constraints on executive   -0.002    0.001** 
   (0.002)    (0.000) 
Presidential system   -0.091***    0.097*** 
   (0.018)    (0.026) 
Rural party in power   0.634***    0.446*** 
   (0.221)    (0.144) 
Constant  -4.444*** -4.687***  -3.328***  -3.265*** 
  (0.408) (0.508)  (0.513)  (0.576) 
Observations  1261 1077  1261  1077 
R
2 0.39 0.43  0.17  0.22 
Number of countries  60 58  60  58 
Country-fixed effects  No No  Yes  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  No No  Yes  Yes 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
   
The dependent variable is the relative rate of assistance (RRA) calculated as ((1+NRAag)/(1+NRAnonag)-1) where NRAag is the nominal rate of 
assistance to tradable agricultural products and NRAnonag is the nominal rate of assistance to tradable non-agricultural products. Ideology is 
coded as 1 for Right wing governments; 2 for Centrist and 3 for Left-Wing governments. We use the political ideology of the executive for 
Presidential systems; of the largest governing party in the parliament for parliamentary system and average of the Executive and largest party for 
mixed systems. Columns 1, and 2 present pooled OLS estimates; columns 3 and 4 present within-estimates with country and time fixed effects.   4
Table 4: Inequality and agricultural protection: per capita GDP 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  RRA RRA  RRA  RRA  RRA 
Inequality  0.109*** 0.054*  0.107***  0.049** 0.050** 
  (0.020) (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Inequality*per capita GDP  -0.014*** -0.008**  -0.014***  -0.006** -0.006** 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
per capita GDP  0.800*** 0.792***  0.768***  0.484***  0.488*** 
  (0.084) (0.237)  (0.088)  (0.110)  (0.111) 
Constraints on executive     -0.004***    0.001 
     (0.001)    (0.001) 
Presidential system     -0.063**    0.037 
     (0.025)    (0.028) 
Rural party in power     0.068    0.205 
     (0.187)    (0.227) 
Constant  -6.308*** -6.091***  -6.031***  -3.680***  -3.944*** 
  (0.724) (1.993)  (0.755)  (0.854)  (0.948) 
Observations  450 43  441  450  441 
R
2  0.46 0.67  0.46  0.31  0.30 
Number of countries  62 43  62  62  62 
Country-fixed effects  No No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  No No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
   
The dependent variable is the relative rate of assistance (RRA) calculated as ((1+NRAag)/(1+NRAnonag)-1) where NRAag is the nominal rate of 
assistance to tradable agricultural products and NRAnonag is the nominal rate of assistance to tradable non-agricultural products. Columns 1, and 
2 present pooled OLS estimates; columns 3 and 4 present within-estimates with country and time fixed effects. Column 2 uses Land Gini as the 
measure of inequality. All others use income Gini.    5
Table 5: Ideology, i8nequality and agricultural protection: share of employment 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  RRA RRA  RRA  RRA  RRA 
Left-wing ideology  -0.119*** -0.036*       
  (0.040) (0.021)       
Ideology*share of agriculture in employment  0.002** 0.001       
  (0.001) (0.001)       
Gini     -0.026***  -0.038***  -0.015** 
     (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Gini* share of agriculture in employment     0.000***  0.002*  0.000* 
     (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
share of agriculture in employment  -0.018*** -0.026***  -0.031***  -0.018***  -0.032*** 
  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Constraints on executive  -0.011***   -0.014  -0.055  0.009 
  (0.001)   (0.016)  (0.048)  (0.015) 
Presidential system  -0.243***   -0.119***  -0.064  0.031 
  (0.027)   (0.038)  (0.074)  (0.040) 
Rural party in power  0.784***   0.084  0.000  0.276 
  (0.282)   (0.240)  (0.000)  (0.271) 
Constant  1.137*** 0.749***  1.691***  2.065***  1.159*** 
  (0.095) (0.108)  (0.222)  (0.480)  (0.342) 
Observations  645 645  284  27 284 
R
2 0.25 0.31  0.37  0.63  0.33 
Number of countries  49 49  50  27  50 
Country-fixed effects  No Yes  No  No  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  No Yes  No  No  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                 
The dependent variable is the relative rate of assistance (RRA) calculated as ((1+NRAag)/(1+NRAnonag)-1) where NRAag is the nominal rate of assistance to tradable 
agricultural products and NRAnonag is the nominal rate of assistance to tradable non-agricultural products. Ideology is coded as 1 for Right wing governments; 2 for Centrist 
and 3 for Left-Wing governments. We use the political ideology of the executive for Presidential systems; of the largest governing party in the parliament for parliamentary 
system and average of the Executive and largest party for mixed systems. Columns 1, 3, and 4 present pooled OLS results; the rest present results with country and time fixed 
effects. Column 4 uses Land Gini as the measure of inequality. Columns 3 and 5 use income Gini.   6
Table 6: Lobbying and agricultural protection 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 









Employment in agriculture 
(% of total employment) 
-0.913*** -2.712*** -2.991*** -3.423*** 
  (0.134) (0.406) (0.821) (0.894) 
Agricultural productivity  0.069*** 0.194*** 0.261*** 0.269*** 
  (0.021) (0.035) (0.082) (0.101) 
Constraints on executive  -0.005* 0.003*  0.004  0.004 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Presidential system  -0.134*** -0.005  0.020  0.023 
  (0.022) (0.028) (0.066) (0.071) 
Rural party in power  0.389*** 0.385*** 0.398*** 0.405*** 
  (0.150) (0.095) (0.114) (0.121) 
Constant  0.052 -0.908***  -1.577**  -1.469 
  (0.198) (0.330) (0.794) (0.967) 
Observations  746 746 376 313 
R
2  0.30 0.28 0.43 0.48 
Number of countries  58 58 20 17 
Country-fixed effects  No  Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects  No  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
 
Column 1 presents pooled OLS results; columns 2-4 present results with country and time fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 include all countries; 
column 3 includes only OECD countries; from which Column 4 excludes the Cairns group of countries (Australia, Canada and New Zealand).   7
Table 7: Revenue motive for agricultural protection 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 




Direct taxes (% of total 
taxes) 
-0.002**  -0.003** -0.002*  -0.003** 0.005  -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.001) 
Revealed comp adv in 
agriculture 
 -0.047   -0.091  -0.182  -0.023 
   (0.057)   (0.057)  (0.270)  (0.051) 
Constraints on executive   0.001***   0.001***  0.000  0.001** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Presidential system   0.114***   0.172***  0.000  0.124*** 
   (0.023)   (0.027)  (0.000)  (0.019) 
Constant  0.223***  0.356*** 0.132**  0.285*** 0.943*  -0.049 
  (0.055) (0.084)  (0.064) (0.069)  (0.477)  (0.047) 
Observations  554 301  531 285  100  185 
Number of countries  64 50  64 49  19  30 
R
2  0.13 0.14  0.13 0.14  0.51  0.34 
Country-fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
     
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture. The dependent variable in columns 3-6 is the relative 
rate of assistance to agriculture (RRA) calculated as ((1+NRAag)/(1+NRAnonag)-1) where NRAag is the nominal rate of assistance to tradable 
agricultural products and NRAnonag is the nominal rate of assistance to tradable non-agricultural products. Direct taxes include income taxes, 
profits and capital gains tax. Revealed comparative advantage in agriculture is defined as (X-M)/(X+M where X is exports and M is imports of 
agricultural products. All columns include country and time fixed effects. Column 5 shows results with only OECD countries; column 6 shows 
results with only non-OECD countries. 
 